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Abstract
This paper describes a simple and tractable method for identifying equivalence
scales that reflect the value judgements implicit in a tax and transfer system. The
approach depends on two identifying assumptions and a functional description for
transfer payments that can be estimated using common publicly available data
sources. We use this approach to evaluate tax implicit equivalence scales for the
tax-transfer systems of 12 European countries that applied in 2012. Cross-country
averages for the tax implicit scales generate a surprising set of stylised results: at
low incomes, each additional household member increases the tax implicit scale
by approximately 0.5, relative to 1.0 for the first adult; at high incomes, the
average tax implicit scales describe variation that is remarkably similar to the
modified OECD scale. However, substantial cross-country variation underlies these
average scales, suggesting important differences in value judgements underlying
the respective tax-transfer systems; differences that can otherwise be difficult to
discern in complex and opaque systems.
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1 Introduction
Equivalence scales are a commonly used metric to summarise differences in the relative
needs of heterogeneous households. Despite their widespread use, however, there is no
consensus about how such scales should be identified. This paper contributes to the
existing literature by proposing a simple analytical approach for deriving equivalence
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scales that reflect the value judgements implicit in tax and transfer policy; hereafter
referred to as tax implicit (equivalence) scales. The proposed tax implicit scales depend
upon qualitatively different assumptions to other scales that are in common use, and
can be identified using widely available data sources. The proposed scales consequently
provide both a transparent measure of the relative treatment by a tax-transfer system
of alternative tax units, and a potentially useful alternative statistic to control for tax
unit heterogeneity when conducting distributional analyses.
Most empirically evaluated equivalence scales are based on consumer demand the-
ory.1 Three key conceptual problems can be identified with demand based scales (e.g
Chiappori [3], Section 1): the focus on family rather than individual specific utilities; the
assumption that family preferences are fully defined by a family’s characteristics; and
the assumption of a strong version of interpersonal comparison of utilities that applies
both within and between families.2 Such criticisms have long been recognised, result-
ing in claims that “the equivalence scales required for welfare comparisons are logically
distinct from those which arise in demand analaysis”, Pollak and Wales ([5], p. 216);
Muellbauer [6].
The resulting confusion concerning how equivalence scales are most appropriately
identified has motivated a popular trend toward the use of scales that take highly stylised
forms. The modified OECD scale, first proposed by Hagenaars et al. [7], is one such
measure.3 Although stylised scales tend to be highly transparent, they also provide a
restrictive description of the relative needs of heterogeneous tax units, which suggests
a need for associated sensitivity analysis. This points to the usefulness of an identifica-
tion approach for equivalence scales that differs substantively from those applied in the
established literature.
A number of alternative approaches for identifying equivalence scales have been sug-
gested in the recent literature. Recognising that observable decisions can at best be used
to obtain an ordinal description of preferences, Browning et al. [9] suggest an empirical
approach designed to identify ‘indifference scales’ that describe the income differences an
individual would require to attain the same indifference curve within alternative family
1Deaton and Muellbauer [1], chapters 7 to 9, provides a detailed discussion of the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the demand based approach for estimating equivalence scales. For a discussion of the
advantages and disadvantages of alternative equivalence scales, see also Coulter et al. [2].
2See also the influential critique of demand based equivalence scales by Blundell and Lewbel [4].
3The modified OECD scale is based upon “expert opinion”; see Orshansky [8] for a comparable scale
also based on expert opinion.
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contexts. A more radical departure from consumer based equivalence scales is to elicit
the information necessary for identification directly from survey respondents. The intu-
itive appeal of ‘subjective equivalence scales’ evaluated using this method is somewhat
tempered by the counterfactual nature inherent in associated survey questions, and a
general lack of statistical consistency identified in the related literature.4 This paper
focuses on the use of tax policy as an alternative source for identifying equivalence
scales.
Tax implicit equivalence scales are rarely considered in the existing literature. Yet,
tax and transfer systems translate an explicit defined set of tax unit characteristics
(defined broadly to include income and wealth) into disposable income. The positive
relationship that exists between disposable income and welfare implies that transfer
systems reflect a set of value judgements concerning the relative merits of alternative
tax units; value judgements that provide a potential basis for identifying an equivalence
scale.
A small number of studies have evaluated the equivalence scales implicit in selected
transfer schemes, usually focussing upon minimum income payments. Olken [11] suggests
a method for identifying ‘community equivalence scales’, on the assumption that the
individuals who receive social assistance are selected to maximise an assumed social
welfare function. Given explicit assumptions concerning the social welfare function, it is
possible to derive a closed-form solution for the proportion of the population in receipt
of support. This closed-form can be estimated as a standard binary choice model to
identify the parameters of a policy implicit equivalence scale. Olken uses this approach
to estimate the equivalence scales implied by a subsidised rice program offered to poor
households in Indonesia.5
Other studies have evaluated the scales implicit in selected transfer schemes by taking
the ratio of the payments made to alternative household types; e.g. HMSO [13] for an
early example in relation to UK income support payments, and Stewart [14] for old
age pensions. This latter approach has the advantage that it does not depend upon
assumptions concerning the existence of a social welfare function or the specification of
the equivalence scale. It is also tacitly supported by the observation that some countries
(e.g. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway) have set income support payments
4Bishop et al. [10] attempt to mitigate the criticisms associated with use of subjective equivalence
scales by drawing on a relatively large survey sample, and by focussing on measures of poverty rather
than inequality more generally.
5See also Lall et al. [12] for equivalence scales implicit in a housing subsidy in South Africa.
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with reference to budget standards for low income households.6
This study contributes to the above literature by describing a simple analytical ap-
proach for identifying equivalence scales implicit in an entire tax and transfer system,
based on two identifying assumptions and a functional description for transfer payments.
The two assumptions upon which our identification approach is based - horizontal eq-
uity and tax independence - bear close similarities to assumptions commonly adopted
in empirical studies of inequality and tax progressivity. Furthermore, the functional
description of the transfer system required for the identification approach is present in
a range of tax-transfer calculators in current use (e.g. Euromod, TAXSIM, TAXBEN,
MITTS, SWITCH, etc), or can be estimated from common micro-data sources (e.g.
EU-SILC, the US Current Population Survey, the UK Family Resources Survey, the
Australian Survey of Income and Housing Costs).
We apply the approach to obtain tax implicit equivalence scales for 12 European
countries. This application sheds light on the great diversity of relativities implicit in
transfer policies in Europe. It also highlights how these tax implicit relativities vary
with income, in contrast to the common assumption of base independence assumed for
equivalence scales in the existing consumer demand literature.
The analytical approach is described in Section 2, and results for 12 European coun-
tries are presented in Section 3. Discussion and directions for further research are pro-
vided in a concluding section.
2 A simple method for identifying tax implicit equiv-
alence scales
We are concerned with identifying the value judgements implicit in the relative treatment
of alternative tax units by an entire tax and transfer system, and not any single transfer
scheme taken in isolation. Assume that there exists a decision body that designs and
implements T ∈ R, which assigns a unique net-transfer payment, ti, to each individual
i from a set of tax units I. t > 0 indicates a net tax levied, and t < 0 a net transfer
received. Assume that the design of T depends upon the rank-ordering of all tax units
i ∈ I in terms of relative merit, as perceived by the decision body. Before proceeding
with the exposition, it is useful to address directly the intended interpretation of T .
6Budget standards, also referred to as minimum income standards or reference budgets, are priced
baskets of goods and services; e.g. [15], [16].
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It is not suggested that T be interpreted as representing a ‘social consensus’; the
heated debate that often accompanies transfer policy reforms suggests that no consensus
view may exist (Coulter et al. [2], p. 100). Rather, T is interpreted as the product of
a policy compromise, in which possibly diverse social views concerning relative merit
interact with the prevailing policy and administrative environment. Furthermore, we
allow the ‘merit’ of a tax unit to depart from individual specific welfare to accommodate
non-welfarist objectives that might influence the design of tax-transfer policy, such as
the determinants of electoral success or the goals of an established bureaucracy (e.g.
Atkinson and Stiglitz [17], p. 9). Hence, the relative merit for tax purposes implicit in
T should be understood as a product of the underlying policy compromise, as opposed to
some form of unadulterated social preference ranking. We return to discuss the practical
implications of this policy compromise for tax implicit scales in Section 3.2.
Assume that the merit of any tax unit i depends only on that unit’s characteristics
vector (xi, φi, ti;xi ∈ X,φi ∈ Φ, ti = T (xi, φi)), and is independent of the characteristics
of all other units in population I. X is the vector of private pre-tax and transfer incomes
(hereafter pre-tax income), and Φ the set of all other relevant characteristics including,
for example, labour status, marital status, number and ages of children, health status
and so on. The net transfer payment ti is included in each tax unit’s characteristics
vector, which is central to the identification strategy set out below.
Denote by D the rule governing the merit ordering of alternative tax unit vectors
(x, φ, t). Thus, (xi, φi, ti) D (xj, φj, tj) implies that tax unit i is at least as meritorious
as tax unit j for the purposes of taxation. Similarly, (xi, φi, ti) ∼D (xj, φj, tj) implies that
tax units i and j have the same merit for tax purposes. It is assumed that the rule D
can be represented by the real-valued function W (x, φ, t) ∈ R, such that W (xi, φi, ti) ≥
W (xj, φj, tj) if and only if (xi, φi, ti) D (xj, φj, tj) for all (i, j ∈ I).
We seek a convenient description of the bearing that characteristics (x, φ, t) have on
tax unit merit, relative to a reference unit. Without loss of generality, define:
W (x, φ, t) =
x− t
w (x, φ, t)
(1)
From equation (1), the bearing that alternative characteristics have on tax unit merit
can be defined in the familiar form of a (relative) equivalence scale. Suppose that all
reference units possess the characteristic vector φr, and consider the impact that any
given characteristic vector, φi, has on tax unit merit. If tax unit i with characteristics
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(xi, φi, ti) has the same merit as reference unit r with characteristics (xr, φr, tr), then:
W (xi, φi, ti) = W (xr, φr, tr)⇒ a (xi, φi, ti) = w (xi, φi, ti)
w (xr, φr, tr)
=
xi − ti
xr − tr (2)
In equation (2), a (xi, φi, ti) is our focus of interest, which we refer to as a tax implicit
equivalence scale. Discounting the after-tax income of tax unit i by the relevant tax
implicit scale a (xi, φi, ti) gives the after-tax income that the reference unit with charac-
teristics φr, (xr − tr), would require to be of equal merit to tax unit i.
For any given vector (xi, φi, ti) 6= (xr, φr, tr), both a (xi, φi, ti) and (xr − tr) are un-
observed, and therefore cannot be inferred from equation (2) alone. To resolve this
indeterminacy, assume that T satisfies the principle of horizontal equity (HE):7
Condition HE: Any two tax units of equal tax merit in the presence of a tax must
also have equal merit if, ceteris paribus, all taxes were set to zero
The condition HE requires:
W (xi, φi, ti) = W (xr, φr, tr)⇔ W (xi, φi, 0) = W (xr, φr, 0) (3)
Substituting equation (1) into (3) and rearranging:
a (xi, φi, ti) =
w (xi, φi, ti)
w (xr, φr, tr)
=
xi − ti
xr − tr ⇔ a (xi, φi, 0) =
w (xi, φi, 0)
w (xr, φr, 0)
=
xi
xr
(4)
Note that HE has not resolved the indeterminacy of our problem, as it has added one
equation and one unknown, a (xi, φi, 0). An additional restriction is therefore required
for identification. We propose the condition of tax independence (TI) to resolve the
remaining indeterminacy:
Condition TI: Relative merit for tax purposes is independent of the tax function
TI requires that the same tax implicit scale applies to both pre-tax and after-tax
incomes; i.e. a (x, φ, 0) = a (x, φ, t) = a (x, φ) for all (x ∈ X,φ ∈ Φ). A necessary and
sufficient condition for TI is that w (x, φ, t) = w′ (x, φ) for all (x ∈ X,φ ∈ Φ, t ∈ T ).
Note that this restriction does not also imply that W (.) is independent of t; rather, it
requires that there exists a monotonic transformation of W (.) that is linear in t. Note
also that HE and TI do not require a (.) to be independent of pre-tax income x, which
is likely to be important in most practical contexts. Imposing TI, and rearranging (4)
gives:
tr
xr
=
ti
xi
(5)
7This interpretation of HE can be contrasted with stronger interpretations that impose no-reranking
conditions as considered, for example, by Plotnick [18].
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Hence, whereas Engel’s original proposition for identifying an equivalence scale was that
any two tax units should be considered ‘equally well-off’ if they devote an equal share of
their income to food expenditure, the current framework suggests that they should be
considered of ‘equal merit for tax purposes’ if they pay an equal share of their income
in (net) taxes.
Modern tax and transfer systems share two key features. First, they tend to provide
financial subsidies at low or negative pre-tax incomes. Secondly, most systems include a
degree of progressivity, characterised by increasing marginal tax rates. The identification
approach that we suggest for tax implicit scales is based upon these two features, in
combination with equation (5).
Define the set of non-income characteristics for analysis, Φˆ. For each feasible combi-
nation of non-income characteristics, φi ∈ Φˆ, evaluate the average tax rate as a function
of pre-tax income; fi(x) = T (x, φi) /x. The two features of modern tax-transfer systems
referred to above imply that average effective tax rates of modern progressive tax-transfer
systems tend to increase in pre-tax income, rising from negative infinity about zero pre-
tax income, and asymptoting toward the higher marginal tax rate at very high pre-tax
incomes. Select a reference unit φr, so that T (0, φr) 6= 0 and the function fr varies
strictly monotonically over each of the domains x > 0 and x < 0; note that the domain
x < 0 is ignored in much of the inequality literature, but is included here for complete-
ness. For the strictly positive domain of pre-tax income, the tax implicit equivalence
scale of any tax unit, i, with characteristics (xi, φi) measured relative to the reference
unit φr is then equal to the ratio xi/xˆr (from equation 4), where xˆr is the unique value
given by the condition fr (xˆr) = fi (xi) (from equation 5), obtained either by inverting
fr (.) or via a search routine over the strictly positive domain. A similar approach can be
used to evaluate tax implicit scales over the domain of strictly negative pre-tax incomes.
At zero pre-tax income, all tax units for which T (x, φi) < 0 will have the same average
effective tax rate (negative infinity), and the tax implicit equivalence scale of any unit
can then be evaluated as T (0, φi) /T (0, φr) (from equation 2).
Although strict monotonicity of the average tax rates in pre-tax income is a property
that tends to be supported by modern progressive tax and transfer systems, it is not
guaranteed in practice. Poverty traps remain prevalent, sometimes hidden by system
complexity and overlapping withdrawal of alternative benefits payments. Furthermore,
at very high incomes marginal effective tax rates can fall very substantively as the
affluent take advantage of complex tax minimisation strategies that are out of the reach
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of the majority of tax payers.8 Of the EU15 countries described by Euromod for 2012,
for example, average tax rates of single working aged adults (a convenient reference
unit) are strictly increasing in 10 countries only. Average tax rates are non-decreasing
but flat over an appreciable income range in Portugal and over a small income band in
Finland. Average tax rates are decreasing over a substantial income range in Spain and
are incomplete in two countries (Greece and Italy). Where the average tax rates of the
reference tax unit are found to be non-increasing in pre-tax income, we suggest that any
indeterminacy of the tax implicit scale can be resolved by selecting equals to obtain the
smallest mis-match between pre-tax incomes that is consistent with condition (5). We
return to discuss scales based on Euromod in Section 3.
The structure that we impose on preference orderings to identify equivalence scales
is not novel. Consider, for example, the established literature that identifies equivalence
scales based on consumer demand theory. As observed data do not generally provide
information on the joint distribution of preferences over goods and household demo-
graphics that are required for welfare comparisons ([5]; [4]), an influential method for
identifying equivalence scales based on consumer demand theory is to assume a utility
structure that satisfies the condition of Independence of Base (IB; [19] and [20]).9 IB
requires that utility equality is preserved under income scaling. This is similar in spirit
to the constraints imposed by HE and TI, which require that tax merit equality is pre-
served by scaling of average tax rates. Whereas IB implies that the equivalence scale will
be independent of utility and income, HE and TI imply that tax implicit equivalence
scales will be independent of the tax function, T .
A feature of the literature that explores expenditure-based equivalence scales is that
identifying assumptions like IB tend to impose limitations on preferences that vary
across household types, or the way that demographic variables enter demand equations,
which facilitate econometric evaluation and testing. In contrast, the system that we
suggest above for identifying tax implicit scales is exactly identified, so that the joint
8In the 14 August 2011 edition of the New York Times, for example, the financier Warren Buffet
claimed that his effective average tax rate was 17.4 per cent on annal taxable earnings of just under
$7 million. In contrast, he reported that the average tax rates of the other 20 staff in his office –
who presumably earned considerably less than he did – ranged from 33 to 41 percent, and averaged 36
percent.
9Blackorby and Donaldson [20] call this property equivalence scale exactness, and show that it per-
mits identification if preferences are not piglog. Donaldson and Pendakur [21] propose a generalisation
of the IB property that imposes less restrictive conditions on preferences allowing equivalence scales to
vary with utility levels.
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assumptions of HE and TI cannot be tested.
Testable implications require over-identifying assumptions, and there are very few
generally accepted principals of taxation that we might refer to when formulating such
assumptions. The condition of HE is a notable exception, but as our above analysis
shows, this condition is insufficient to permit identification of a tax implicit equivalence
scale on its own. Any attempt to define a testable criterion for identifying tax implicit
equivalence scales must therefore take account of alternative considerations.
One justifiable approach is to select identifying assumptions that are in some sense
analytically convenient. This is one motivation for relying on the condition TI, which
ensures that the same tax implicit scale is applicable for both pre-tax and post-tax
incomes. Our above analysis indicates that a stronger set of assumptions would be
required to ensure that tax implicit equivalence scales are independent of income. A fur-
ther implication of our above analysis is that the assumptions required to ensure income
independent tax implicit equivalence scales would also result in testable implications,
consistent with consumer demand theory in relation to the IB condition. We have not,
however, pursued this line of enquiry for two reasons. First, we agree with the propo-
sition of Seneca and Taussig ([22], p. 255), who suggest that “the most interesting and
important issues involving the application of equivalence scales to tax equity questions
are intimately bound up with the variation of equivalence scales with the level of in-
come”. Secondly, the limited empirical analysis that we have conducted using the above
identifying criteria suggest that any over-identifying assumptions required to ensure that
tax implicit equivalence scales are independent of income are likely to be strongly re-
jected by the data, echoing findings in the consumer-demand literature.10 We present
one such analysis below.
3 Tax implicit scales for a sample of European coun-
tries
This section illustrates how tax implicit equivalence scales can be used to shed light on
the relativities implicit in transfer policy. We begin by describing how the identification
method described in Section 2 has been implemented, using a publicly available data
10Several papers have tested the independence of base assumption using parametric (Blundell and
Lewbel [4]; Pashardes [23]) and semiparametric methods (Blundell et al. [24]; Pendakur [25]). Dickens
et al. [26] test the IB hypothesis in the context of linear and non-linear demand models. All these
papers find statistical evidence to reject the demand restrictions implied by the IB condition.
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source. Our objective here is to walk the reader through the steps that we have im-
plemented to arrive at the scales that are reported, and to point out potential pit-falls
along the way. Estimates of the implicit equivalence scales for a sample of 12 European
countries are then presented and the commonalities and differences in the implicit fiscal
relativities across countries discussed.
3.1 Identifying tax implicit scales
The identification method described in Section 2 requires a description of the function
translating individual specific characteristics into net transfer payments, T (x, φ). Ap-
proximations to country specific functions considered here were derived using Euromod,
a tax-transfer microsimulation model for the European Union. Euromod is free of charge
for non-commercial use, and the current application requires only the tax-transfer cal-
culator of the model. This simplifies the associated application process, as it is not
necessary to obtain access to the extensive micro-data that are the basis for microsimu-
lation projections using Euromod; see [27] for a technical description of the model, and
www.euromod.ac.uk for information concerning the application process.
After installing the Euromod software (version 1.10.2 was used here) and extracting
the associated ‘content files’, the ‘hypothetical data’ application provided with the model
was used to generate a synthetic data-set comprised of single adults with up to one
dependent child, and adult couples with up to three dependent children. Consistent
with the focus of most tax and transfer systems, the current analysis is organised around
family units, comprised of a single adult or partner couple, and their dependent children
(sometimes referred to as benefit units). All single adults were defined as 32 year old
females, not studying, and educated to an upper secondary qualification. Those in work
were defined as employees in the services industry, working in clerical occupations for 12
months. Partners, wherever considered for analysis, were defined as 36 year old males,
with the same education as their spouses. The first child in each family was defined as
a 3 year old female, the second a 5 year old male, and the third a 7 year old female. All
individuals were denoted as free from disability, and all non-labour sources of income,
rent, mortgage interest, and private pension contributions were set to zero.
The hypothetical data application of Euromod projects a range of employment in-
comes for each set of family characteristics described above. It does this by assuming
a fixed hourly wage rate, and increasing labour supply at hourly intervals from 0 to
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99 hours per week per adult. These data, however, complicate the current analysis,
because they introduce confounding effects associated with the division of labour and
employment income among family members. In the case of the UK, for example, income
of couples is taxed on an individual (not joint) basis, and some transfers only become
payable if all adults in the family work at least 15 hours per week. A full description
of the function translating individual characteristics into a tax implicit scale requires as
arguments all of the characteristics that affect levied taxes and eligible transfers in a
country. In the UK context, this would mean including the income of each adult family
member, and their respective hours of employment in the description of the tax implicit
scale.
The dimensionality of tax implicit scales is limited here by comparing families that
differ only in relation to pre-tax income, and the number and age of family members.
This was achieved by (manually) amending the hypothetical data generated by Euromod
so that one adult family member was defined as working for 35 hours per week wherever
employment income was greater than zero. Furthermore, family labour income was
adjusted to increase at intervals of 10 Euros between 0 and 1000 Euros per month, and
by 50 Euros between 1050 and 10000 Euros per month (implying 281 observations for
each family type). This ‘training data-set’, which is available upon request from the
authors, was submitted to Euromod’s tax-transfer calculator for 2012, for each country
in the EU15, to generate measures of post-tax and transfer incomes. Default options
for the tax-transfer calculator were adopted, subject to the assumption of full take-up
of eligible transfer payments. Minimum wages were suppressed for the analysis, and all
financial data were defined in a common currency (Euros). Each country specific model
was also directed to report household level output.
Three EU15 countries were excluded from the analysis. Pre-tax and transfer income
for France appeared to be subject to top-coding by the Euromod tax-transfer calculator,
motivating exclusion of that country from the analysis. The Euromod tax-transfer cal-
culator generated zero transfer income for Greece and Italy at zero hours of employment.
As both countries provide a welfare safety net for the unemployed, these incomplete tax
schedules reported by Euromod were omitted from the analysis. Post-tax and transfer
income generated by Euromod for all other countries appeared sensible, subject to three
minor complications. In the case of Finland, transfer income at zero hours of employ-
ment showed important differences with the Euromod report for this country (Ahola et
al. [28], p. 20). For this reason Finland was excluded from the analysis at zero pre-tax
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income. In the cases of Denmark and Ireland, post-tax and transfer income generated
by Euromod falls sharply between 0 and 10 Euros per month, as transfers are withdrawn
due to the assumption of 35 hours of labour per week. These sharp falls in disposable
income are of no practical relevance, due to the minimum effective wage rates prevail-
ing in the respective countries, but do complicate evaluation of tax implicit equivalence
scales.11 For this reason, tax implicit equivalence scales reported at positive but low
incomes (below approximately 1500 Euro per month) should be treated with caution for
all countries, especially Denmark and Ireland.
The reference unit assumed for analysis is a single adult without dependent children.
All calculations, tables and figures were produced by a single Stata ‘do’ file that is
available upon request from the authors. The different assumptions concerning labour
supply at zero and positive pre-tax income motivate separate treatment for evaluation of
tax implicit scales. Following the methodology set out in Section 2, the Stata program
evaluates the tax implicit scale of any family at zero pre-tax income by dividing the
family’s post-tax and transfer income by the post-tax and transfer income of the reference
unit when that unit also has zero pre-tax income. If target pre-tax income is greater
than zero, the Stata routine identifies the average effective tax rate associated with the
prevailing family type, which we referred to here as the ‘target tax rate’. The Stata
routine then searches for ‘reference measures’ of pre-tax income, at which the average
effective tax rate for the reference unit is equal to the target tax rate. This search
is conducted assuming that average tax rates vary linearly between the 280 discrete
points with positive pre-tax income described by Euromod’s training data-set for the
reference unit. Multiple reference measures of pre-tax income were identified in a few
cases for Spain, Finland and Portugal, as the reference average tax rates identified for
each of those countries are not strictly monotonic in pre-tax income. In these few cases,
the Stata routine is designed to select the reference measure of pre-tax income that is
closest to the prevailing target pre-tax income (see previous section). The equivalence
scale is then evaluated as the prevailing target pre-tax income divided by the selected
reference measure of pre-tax income.
11The statutory minimum wage in 2012 in Ireland was 1461.85 Euros per month, compared with
unemployment benefits for single adults without children worth 815.92 Euros per month. Although
there was no statutory minimum wage in Denmark in 2012, enterprise agreements implied an average
minimum wage of approximately 95 kroner per hour, equal to 2197.51 Euros per month. This compares
with unemployment benefits for single adults without children in Denmark worth 1065.02 Euros per
month.
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Before moving on to the empirical results, two important qualifications are of note.
First, Euromod is under continual development, and consequently the results presented
in this paper may not match those that would be obtained using versions of the model
other than 1.10.2. Secondly, the scales that are reported here reflect only those tax and
transfer schemes that are represented in Euromod. Although a great deal of care is
exercised by the Euromod team to capture cash transfers, the model does not extend
to include in-kind benefits. Paulus et al. [29] report analysis that augments the cash
transfers represented in Euromod to take account of in-kind benefits for housing, ed-
ucation, and health care for a sample of five European countries (Belgium, Germany,
Greece, Italy, and the UK). This analysis reveals that, although the in-kind benefits
are qualitatively smaller in magnitude than the coincident cash transfers, the in-kind
benefits do have an important bearing on distributional measures as they are skewed
toward low income households. Furthermore, the study reveals important differences in
the scale of in-kind benefits provided in the sample of countries considered. Accounting
for such factors would consequently seem an important avenue for further research.
3.2 Tax implicit scales for EU15 countries
The equivalence scales that were derived as discussed above provide a fascinating insight
into the relativities that are implicit in tax and transfer policy adopted among EU15
countries. Table 1 reports the tax implicit scales evaluated at zero pre-tax income, which
differ from the other scales discussed here because they are based on the assumption of
zero (rather than 35) hours of employment.
Table 1 indicates that tax implicit equivalence scales at zero pre-tax income strictly
increase with family size in all 11 EU countries12. This reflects the fact that transfers
(as reported by Euromod) tend to rise with the number of family members. Focussing
on the country averages reported in the last row of Table 1, the addition of each family
member tends to increase eligible transfer payments by approximately half the transfers
of a single childless adult. The relative simplicity of this variation, however, belies
substantial cross-country variation indicated by the remaining statistics reported in the
table.
Countries are approximately evenly split between those that provide greater trans-
fer payments in respect of the first dependent child of single adults, and those that
12Finland is excluded from Table 1, as discussed in Section 3.1.
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Table 1: Tax implicit equivalence scales at zero pre-tax income, by country for 2012
single adult single adult couple couple couple couple
Country no children 1 child no children 1 child 2 children 3 children
AT 1.000 1.270 1.500 1.770 2.256 2.988
BE 1.000 1.596 1.333 1.539 1.786 2.149
DE 1.000 1.757 1.719 2.244 2.778 3.417
DK 1.000 1.494 2.000 2.626 2.771 2.883
ES 1.000 1.154 1.081 1.202 1.324 1.446
IE 1.000 1.330 1.664 1.994 2.324 2.664
LU 1.000 1.370 1.504 1.804 2.154 2.614
NL 1.000 1.458 1.409 1.572 1.684 1.786
PT 1.000 1.723 1.700 2.386 3.071 3.772
SE 1.000 1.653 1.782 2.461 3.153 3.957
UK 1.000 2.161 1.570 2.730 3.647 4.563
Average 1.000 1.542 1.569 2.030 2.450 2.931
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from Euromod v 1.10.2
Notes: ‘Average’ reports unweighted arithmetic mean of country specific scales
provide greater transfers for a spouse. In Austria (AT), Denmark (DK), Ireland (IE),
Luxembourg (LU), and Sweden (SE), transfers payable for a spouse in a childless family
exceed those payable for the first dependent child of a single parent by between 20 and
100%. This reflects the greater living expenses that are generally associated with adults
than children in the existing equivalence scales literature. Results obtained for Belgium
(BE), Spain (ES) and the UK stand at the opposite end of the scale, where the transfer
payments associated with a spouse are a fraction of the transfers associated with the
first dependent child of a single parent. Furthermore, results obtained for the three
remaining EU15 countries reported in the table (Germany (DE), Netherlands (NL), and
Portugal (PT)) all indicate slightly higher transfers payable for the first dependent child
of a single-parent, than for a spouse in a childless household.
In all cases other than LU, those tax-transfer systems for which the tax implicit
equivalence scale of single adults with one dependent child are greater than those of adult
couples without children also show larger increases in scale for the first dependent child
among single adults than couples. This result suggests that some systems are especially
adapted to support single parents, relative to other demographic groups. Considering the
incremental increase in scale associated with the addition of dependent children in couple
households reveals that most countries tend to provide increasingly generous benefits
to larger families. This is most clearly evident for Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg,
where the incremental increase in benefits in respect of the third child is over half as great
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again as those payable for the first dependent child. The reverse is true in Denmark, the
Netherlands and the UK, where the incremental benefits for the third dependent child
are at least 20 percent less than those for the first child.
These results demonstrate how far the tax-transfer systems of many EU15 countries
fail to reflect expenditure needs as described by the consumer demand literature. As
noted previously in this paper, departures between tax implicit and consumption based
equivalence scales may be interpreted as indicating the extent to which formulation
of transfer policy depends on a wider set of considerations than a limited response to
consumption needs. What is perhaps surprising, however, is the diversity of approaches
adopted, even among a sample of countries that share many cultural similarities; as in
the case of Austria, relative to Germany and the Netherlands, relative to Belgium.
It is beyond the scope of the current study to conduct a detailed analysis of the
cross-country differences of tax implicit scales that are identified above. Nevertheless,
it is useful to discuss issues concerning the practical importance of differences reported
in the table. One issue that cannot be inferred directly from any tax implicit scale
concerns the relative concentration of the respective population in relation to the tax
implicit scales; the scales reported in Table 1, for example, apply only to individuals
with zero pre-tax incomes, and will consequently be more important in some countries
(where unemployment rates are relatively high) than others. Another important factor
determining the practical importance of alternative tax implicit scales concerns their
persistence through time. Although there is typically a great deal of persistence in
the underlying features of modern tax and transfer systems, the details of individual
transfer schemes also tend to be in a constant state of flux as they are adapted to the
changing political and institutional context. While the country specific tax implicit
scales discussed above describe relative tax merit (as defined in Section 2) applicable in
2012, they do not indicate the extent to which these relativities persist through time.
One plausible approach for distinguishing persistent features of tax implicit scales
applicable in any country would be to consider moving averages of scales evaluated on
the transfer policy applicable in the country through time. In a similar vein, the cross-
country averages reported in the last row of Table 1 aggregate over diverse political
and institutional contexts, and may consequently provide a more reliable indication of
persistent features of transfer policy than any of the country specific scales taken in
isolation. Our analysis above indicates substantive cross-country variation between tax
implicit scales; exploring the extent of intertemporal variation of country specific scales
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Figure 1: Tax implicit equivalence scales by family type and pre-tax income, EU15
country averages for 2012
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remains an interesting dimension for further research.
As alluded to at the end of Section 2, many of the tax implicit equivalence scales
considered for EU15 countries vary substantially with pre-tax income. Figure 1 reports
variation of tax implicit scales with pre-tax income, averaged over the twelve EU15
countries for which data were obtained from Euromod (i.e. the 11 countries reported in
Table 1 plus Finland). This figure indicates that the tax implicit equivalence scales of
families with children tend to rise with pre-tax income, to peak somewhere between 1000
and 1500 Euros per month, before falling away and levelling off at higher incomes. For
comparison, minimum full-time incomes in the EU15 (where they existed) were worth
approximately 1200 Euros per month in 2012, and average incomes were approximately
3150 Euros per month. At the top of the considered range of pre-tax income, tax implicit
scales of families with children are compressed by 10 to 20%, relative to their respective
values at the bottom of the income range. In contrast, the tax implicit scales of childless
couples are fairly constant over the entire income range. Interestingly, the values of the
16
tax implicit scales at the top of the considered pre-tax income range broadly correspond
with the modified OECD scale, which assigns a value of 1.0 to the family reference
person, 0.5 to each additional family member over age 13, and 0.3 to each child aged 13
and under.
While the scales reported in Figure 1 do appear to us rationalisable, it is beyond the
scope of the current study to second-guess the motives that underly them. Nevertheless,
it is useful to discuss here the mechanics that are responsible for the reported variation of
tax implicit scales with pre-tax income. The key factor responsible for the initial climb
in scales associated with families with children is the withdrawal of means-tested transfer
payments, which tend to occur at lower incomes among families without children than
those with children. In this case, the rises reported for tax implicit scales of families with
children are consequently not an indication of increased eligibility for transfer payments
among these families, but of transfers withdrawal from single childless adults. That a
similar rise in tax implicit scales is not observed for couples without children indicates
that these families are subject to similar terms concerning benefits withdrawal as single
adults without children at low incomes (generating similar variation of average effective
tax rates with pre-tax income).
As in relation to the tax implicit scales at zero pre-tax income discussed above, a
great deal of cross-country variation underlies the average scales that are reported in
Figure 1. We single out examples of two broad ‘schools’ for discussion here, and report
graphs and associated discussion for all countries as part of the “Online Supplemental
Material” to this paper.
The top panel of Figure 2 reports tax implicit equivalence scales for Belgium, and
the bottom panel reports scales for Sweden. The tax implicit scales reported in the two
panels of Figure 2 reflect the average scales taken over all 12 EU15 countries reported
in Figure 1, in that they both display substantive variation with pre-tax income below
6000 Euros per month, before levelling out at higher incomes. Besides markedly different
values at low income levels, a key difference between the tax implicit scales evaluated for
the two countries is the degree to which family size is observed to influence tax treatment
at higher incomes.
In the case of Belgium – in common with Austria, Germany and Luxembourg – tax
implicit equivalence scales describe substantive differences between family units through-
out the considered income range. In contrast, the tax implicit scales evaluated for Sweden
display no variation by the number of adults in a family at pre-tax income above 3000
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Figure 2: Tax implicit equivalence scales by family type and pre-tax income for Belgium
and Sweden in 2012
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Euros per month, and little variation by the number of dependent children above 5500
Euros per month. Similar observations apply to the tax implicit scales evaluated for
Finland and the UK; the scales evaluated for Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and
Portugal fall between these two extremes.
The muted emphasis that the Swedish transfer system places on family size and
composition at high incomes (the average full-time wage in Sweden in 2012 was 3470
Euro per month) is consistent with a value judgement that the influence of consumption
needs in determining a family’s ‘merit’ for tax purposes declines as income rises. It
seems to us reasonable to suppose, for example, that the decision to have children by
high income households ought to be recognised as a reflection of personal preferences
over which parents bear full financial responsibility. It is also notable that consumption
(in the cross-section) tends to account for a smaller share of family budgets as income
rises.
In contrast, relative to the tax implicit scales evaluated for Sweden, those for Belgium
indicate that substantive provisions for family size are maintained by the tax and transfer
system into the upper end of the income distribution. This would be consistent with
the view that family size has an important bearing on consumption needs regardless
of a family’s income. It could also reflect provision of substantial tax incentives for
fertility to high income individuals. The pattern conjectured by Becker and Tomes [30],
for example, consists of a negative income effect on fertility in low-income groups and
a positive income effect in higher-income groups. Recent studies by Milligan [31] and
Cohen et al. [32] report empirical evidence that the effect of financial incentives on
fertility is positive at high-income levels, but small and negative at low-income levels.
The tax implicit scales reported here reflect the features of the tax and transfer
schemes applied in each country, and the ways in which those schemes interact both
with each other and with pre-tax income. A summary of the broad characteristics of the
tax and transfer systems in the sample of countries considered here is provided as part
of the “Online Supplemental Material” to this paper. Our evaluation of this information
suggests that two important features can be singled out as driving the tax implicit scales
reported above. First, family (especially child) benefits are crucially important, as their
level has a substantive bearing on the value of tax implicit scales at low income levels,
while associated adjustments for pre-tax income (e.g. means testing) affect the extent
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and pace of convergence between similar units with and without children.13 Secondly,
the structure of the tax system is important in determining the degree of convergence
in scales, particularly at high incomes.
Three key alternative approaches to income taxation exist in our data: individual
taxation (Austria, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK);
family taxation without income splitting (Ireland); and family taxation with income
splitting (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Portugal). In context of a progressive
rate structure, family taxation without income splitting will tend to treat couples less
generously than individual taxation, to the extent that it prevents the lower earning
spouse taking advantage of lower tax rates. In the analysis reported above, however, the
assumption of a single income earner implies no effective difference between individual
taxation and family taxation, as there is no tax levied on the activity of the non-earning
spouse. In both of these contexts, the approach to taxation will tend to support a
convergence between the tax implicit scales of singles and couples. In contrast, family
taxation with income splitting will tend to favour couples rather than singles, as it
allows couples to take maximum advantage of any progressivity in income tax rates.
Adjustments to tax thresholds according to family type (as in Belgium, Ireland and
Spain) further contribute to disparities between associated tax implicit scales for singles
and couples.
The bearing on tax implicit scales of the features of tax-transfer policy discussed
above can be readily seen in the scales for Belgium and Sweden that are displayed
in Figure 2. Starting with family benefits at low incomes, although the Belgium and
Swedish systems deliver similar levels of support to single adults with and without a
dependent child, the Swedish system provides qualitatively higher benefits to couples,
and particularly those with at least one dependent child. This relationship between
levels of support offered in each country is reflected by the respective tax implicit scales
at low pre-tax incomes reported in Table 1 and Figure 2. In both countries, while
some family benefits are not means tested, social assistance schemes that provide a
floor to post-tax income, vary with family size and are withdrawn approximately Euro
for Euro in respect of any pre-tax income received. This withdrawal of benefits across
all family types is responsible for the flat profiles of the tax implicit scales reported
over low income ranges in Figure 2. As discussed in the preceding paragraph, Belgium
13Family benefits were not taxable in 2012 in the 12 EU countries in our sample.
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and Sweden employ substantively different approaches to taxation; whereas Belgium
levies taxes at the family level and permits income splitting between spouses, Sweden
taxes at the individual level. Furthermore, the thresholds used to administer progressive
marginal tax rates are designed to respond to family circumstances in Belgium, but are
fixed in Sweden. These differences in approaches to taxation drive the convergence of
tax implicit scales at high incomes reported for Sweden, and the dispersed scales at high
incomes reported for Belgium.
4 Discussion
This paper describes a simple and tractable method for identifying equivalence scales
that reflect the value judgements implicit in a tax and transfer system. Identification
of the implicit relativities is (in general) obtained by assuming that the tax function
mapping fiscal merit and net transfers satisfies two basic properties: the principle of
horizontal equity, which requires that tax units of equal tax merit in context of a tax
should also be of equal merit if all taxes were (ceteris paribus) withdrawn; and the prin-
ciple of tax independence, which requires the fiscal merit of tax units to be independent
of the tax function.
The paper reports results obtained from an illustrative application that compares tax
implicit scales evaluated for 12 European countries in 2012. The tax implicit scales that
are reported vary positively with tax unit size, and describe substantial variation with
pre-tax income. The variation with income is in contrast to the common assumption
of base independence in the consumer demand literature, but is consistent with results
recently reported in the empirical literature.
Cross-country averages for the tax implicit scales generate a surprising set of stylised
results: at low incomes, each additional household member increases the tax implicit
scale by approximately 0.5, relative to 1.0 for the first adult; at high incomes, the
average tax implicit scales describe variation that is remarkably similar to the modified
OECD scale. Beyond these high-level stylisations, the reported tax implicit scales reveal
important differences between countries. For example, whereas tax implicit scales at
high incomes increase substantively with the number of tax unit members in Austria,
Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg, they show little variation in Sweden, Finland and
the UK.
Two qualifications are associated with the tax implicit scales reported in the paper.
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First, they are evaluated on tax-transfer systems described for a single year, and –
given the dynamic nature of modern transfer systems – consequently do not provide
any indication of the extent to which the identified relativities persist through time. It
is suggested that the cross-country averages – by aggregating over diverse political and
administrative contexts – may provide a better indication of persistent value judgements
implicit in (EU) transfer policy. Secondly, the equivalence scales that are reported were
evaluated using Euromod version 1.10.2, and consequently only account for policy as it
is represented in the model. A potentially important omission from the analysis is the
impact of in-kind benefits, as these are not projected by Euromod. Analysis of these
issues remains for further research.
A desirable property of tax implicit equivalence scales is that they provide an ex-
plicit description of the value judgements (implicitly) made by the government when
acting in its role as administrative agent for society. These value judgements are in-
teresting in their own right, and in many countries are highly opaque. Furthermore, it
seems reasonable to suppose that the complexity and fragmented nature of many modern
transfer systems may have detached the relative tax treatment of heterogeneous indi-
viduals from popular perceptions concerning relative needs. In such contexts, cutting
through the complexity to produce transparent measures of relative tax treatment may
help to improve the evidence base for policy discussion, design and reform.
There is a lot more to tax design than reflecting underlying consumption needs; one
common alternative objective is to incentivise socially desirable behaviour. Comparison
of tax implicit scales with equivalence scale estimates based on consumer demand theory
can provide a useful indication of tax incentives over a broad range of characteristics. If,
for example, the tax system makes a larger adjustment for young children than implied
by equivalence scales estimated from consumption behaviour, then it is suggestive of a
the transfer system structured to encourage increased fertility, or to meet a distributional
objective of alleviating child poverty.
One common use of equivalence scales is as a control to aid comparisons of a finan-
cial metric (e.g. consumption, income) between heterogeneous demographic units (e.g.
families, households). In this context, the traditional motivation for using equivalence
scales is to adjust the financial metric to a comparable welfare basis. Interpretation of a
financial metric equivalised using a tax implicit scale is consequently complicated by the
existence of non-welfarist considerations in the design and implementation of tax and
transfer policy.
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The analytical framework described in this paper indicates that tax implicit scales
can be used to equivalise a financial metric observed among heterogeneous tax units
to a comparable basis in terms of ‘tax merit’. Tax merit is a new concept, and further
analysis is required to appreciate its implications in context of the existing distributional
literature. Key issues for consideration include the extent of intertemporal persistence
of value judgements implied by tax implicit scales (and hence of relative tax merit), the
sources of variation both within and between countries, and a better appreciation of the
role of alternative motives underlying tax and transfer policy. Each of these inter-related
subjects is of stand-alone interest, and we believe their role in providing support for the
use of tax implicit scales for distributional analyses would be valuable for (at least) two
reasons.
Firstly, although tax implicit scales may depend on factors that extend beyond simple
welfare comparisons, it is reasonable to expect that a consideration of inter-unit welfare
will lie at the heart of any well-designed tax-transfer system. Such scales, if properly
understood, could consequently off-set the conceptual problems associated with tradi-
tional (demand) analysis. Secondly, the absence of a generally accepted correct approach
for empirically identifying an equivalence scale that is appropriate for making welfare
comparisons focusses attention on associated sensitivity analysis. In this regard, the
tax implicit equivalence scales that we suggest here have the advantages that they can
be objectively observed, and are based on a qualitatively different set of considerations
to existing alternatives. These considerations underly our view that, if properly under-
stood, tax implicit scales would present a valuable alternative for distributional analyses
to the ‘subjective’ and ‘indifference’ scales that have been suggested in the contemporary
literature.
Furthermore, there are at least some contexts in which equivalising on the basis of tax
implicit scales can help to improve the internal consistency of distributional analyses,
even if the concept of ‘tax merit’ is not illuminated beyond the current study. For
example, where an analysis of inequality does not adjust post-tax incomes by the relevant
tax implicit scales, then at least part of the measured inequality will be attributable to
differences in the value judgements concerning relative needs assumed by the analyst,
and those (implicitly) made by the respective tax authorities (e.g. van de Ven and
Creedy [33]). This is most evident in distributional analyses of re-ranking, which explore
how the redistributive effect of a tax system is affected by changes in the rank-order of
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individuals from the pre- to the post-tax income distributions.14 Such studies commonly
adjust incomes by an exogenously assumed equivalence scale, leading to the critique that
this “amounts to “imposing [horizontal inequity] from outside” if the tax is not, in fact,
a family income tax designed to be coherent with an equivalence scale – or indeed if it
is and the scale selected by the analyst is not the same as the one being used by the
policy maker” (Lambert [38], p. 76). Use of tax implicit equivalence scales can help to
allay such concerns.
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